

2018

Spring Security Conference



Conference Notes

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Strategic Autonomy Stronger Europe in a Turbulent World?

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Venue: Profesní dům, Malostranské náměstí 25, Praha 1

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Opening speeches

9:00 – 9:15

- **Miloš Balabán**, Head of the Centre for Security Policy IPS FSS CU
- **Patrick Bellouard**, President of EuroDéfense-France
- **Radka Wildová**, Vice-Rector of the Charles University
- **H.E. Aldo Amati**, Ambassador of Italy to the Czech Republic
- **Anne Seyfferth**, Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Representation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
- **Dana Kovaříková**, Head of European Commission Representation in the Czech Republic

Miloš Balabán started by welcoming all speakers and guests by highlighting the acuteness of the topic of strategic autonomy. He emphasised the connection of the conference both to Prague conference on defence and security as well as meeting of the Eurodefence presidents. And he voiced his happiness about the fact, that the conference takes place under the auspice of several ambassadors.

He noted in how interesting times the conference takes place, remembering the heated discussion about scenarios of future development on this conference two years back. He also remarked, that reality may have gone even further than expected in scenarios. He continued to point out changes in the global distribution of power, the rise of conflicts and instability in European neighbourhood and uncertainty about policies of the United States. He further emphasised the last point posing the question whether Europe needs to be prepared for 'post-American era'. Noting rising discomfort with American policy in Europe, he maintained that autonomy will be hard to achieve and that it may be a mental transition, that is accommodating thinking to new reality, that will prove to be the hardest part of achieving autonomy.

In the end, he also thanked all partners for making the conference possible.

Patrick Bellouard Thanked organisers for organising the conference. He introduced Eurodefence France and emphasised that it is promoting EU strategic autonomy. He debated that we had to wait a long time since Lisbon for instruments of defence cooperation to come to fruition, but emphasised, that it started to realise in the form of common military planning, the coordinated annual review on defence and European defence fund. He also noted that even as it is unfortunate, that UK decided to leave the EU, it also facilitated defence cooperation within EU.

Prof. Radka Wildová welcomed all in the name of the rector of Charles University. She spoke about the fact, that Charles University is aware of problems discussed in Europe and pointed to the fact, that despite the present being difficult for EU, it is also a time of renewed cooperation and further development.

Anne Seyfferth emphasized that FES has security as one of its main interests, Willi Brandt envisioned Europe that speaks with a single voice. We need more of the strategic autonomy, if we achieve it, we will have stronger Europe.

Aldo Amati reassured everyone, that the president maintains the same line on NATO and EU. Second thing – Europe lost its way due to too ambitious and dysfunctional. Fear has taken over Europe, fear for the jobs, fear of migrants, fear of terrorism, sometimes in the last ten years, they decided to get

common objectives but failed to implement the policies to achieve them. Restructuring the army – will we buy European for the sake of European strategic autonomy? New divisions appear in Europe. Budget negotiations are in full swing. The USA will give Europe no more discounts. European leaders are in a way sleepwalkers, we need to wake up.

Jana Kovaříková noted that European integration was from its beginnings build upon two ideas – economic one and security one. While the integration for a long time dominated, there always was spillover to the area of security. Emphasising the importance of the EU’s Global Strategy, she noted that crisis became an impulse to change, which can be seen in reinforced cooperation between EU and NATO, in the establishment of PESCO and EDF, in the proposal of the new European budget, in which the resources designated for defence increase twenty-two-fold. She ended with pointing to the new will of member countries to build common capabilities and stating, that EU member states have to attain strategic autonomy and that European Union is on the right track in this regard.

Session 1		Geopolitical shifts in global development, conflicts in European neighbourhood and the need for stronger EU Common Security and Defence Policy
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New trends in foreign and security policy of the United States – the global retreat of the hegemon. Can Europe cope with it? ▪ Economic and military power growth of non-western actors and its effect on EU security ▪ Can Europe defend its global power status in the new geopolitical environment without the Common Security and Defence Policy? ▪ Africa, Middle East, “frozen conflicts” in Europe’s neighbourhood: How to effectively face the instability

9:15 – 9:35	Opening speeches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lubomír Zaorálek, Chairperson of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, President EuroDéfense-CZ ▪ Edward Rhodes, George Mason University, Washington, D.C.
9:35 – 10:45	Panel discussion (in alphabetic order)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vincenzo Camporini, Vice President of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, former Chief of Defence General Staff of Italy ▪ Aleš Chmelař, State Secretary for European Affairs ▪ H.E. Roland Galharague, Ambassador of France to the Czech Republic ▪ Claudia Major, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin
	Moderator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Miloš Balabán, Head of the Centre for Security Policy IPS FSS CU

Lubomír Zaorálek stated, that he always thought that the foreign policy is a result of projects and strategies, but that now, he starts to feel that it is rather determined by what factors are pushing us at the moment. He claimed that creation of European Economic Community was not a possibility but a necessity. The accession of central Europe to EU was the same case. As he tackled Ukraine or Islamic state during his tenure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he felt that it is the events that force us onwards and we can only react.

He continued that he would very much wish for Europe to achieve autonomy. He noted, that he could never imagine that there will be such lack of unity in our approach to Iran or North Korea. He was convinced about the key role of unity and consensus for achieving results. As much as he understands

that the deal was not perfect, as the expected cooperation of Iran in other areas did not come, he emphasised that we should have come back to negotiations, not burn the deal. He strongly stated, that when you pull one brick from a building, it will collapse on your head.

Regarding North Korea, he noted that he had negotiated with them, and that they won't give up their nuclear weapons. He was surprised, that they got bilateral negotiations with the United States, which they wanted for a long time, essentially for free. He also stated, that he isn't surprised by the cancellation of the bilateral meeting because success was impossible and there were no experts to prepare the meeting. He also noted, that there was a major inconsistency in U.S. stance, when some officials threatened North Korea that it would follow the fate of Libya, which is counterproductive if the goal is for them to give up nuclear weapons.

Edward Rhodes He holds no governmental position, he will speak frankly and bluntly. He brings good news and bad news. Good news, the US is not disengaging from the world, even less disengaging from Europe, transatlantic ties are woven so deeply into every aspect of European or American society that they cannot be simply cut by political decision. One cannot wish the ties away. Bad news, the foreign policy decision is so close to random, that we should see them as such, there is no coherence. There is no strategy. He feels sympathy to European statesman and diplomats regarding their need to deal with changing policies.

One sees that less has changed and less will change that generally assumed. Today, many of the challenges are regional ones instead of global ones. The threat posed by fascism or communism were global, not regional. Problems now are more regional. Even challenges they face together affect parties differentially and may choose different policies. Even if the USA get consistency and strategy, there still will be issues, that Europe will need to tackle as European ones. European institutions need to develop, but transatlantic institutions are not going to go away. They are complements, not substitutes. Today's political and military facts are same as yesterday and tomorrow.

He also points out at the unpredictability of American government today, which spreads confusion and distraction coming from the United States.

Miloš Balabán followed with his first question for panellists, whether there is the threat of American drawback from global order and whether Trump is exception or beginning of a new trend.

Vincenzo Camporini These are vital questions. Sometimes we are considering what is going on today as it should go forever; we are sometimes not prepared for what is coming up. Attention is on migration or Russia, but Problem of Western Balkans is not solved. The US did not want to be involved in western Balkans problems and were dragged in by Europeans. Europeans need to be more responsible for their problems. There is a tendency not to be pragmatic. PESCO as agreed now is stepping back, it should have been few countries, with 25 it will be paralyzed. There is lack of standardisation and interoperability, a lot of types of equipment. EDF may convince our countries and industries to work together. It will ask restructuring of industry, if done with cleverness, it will not impact jobs or development.

Claudia Major It started sooner in the US, with Obama, but Trump is not doing it elegantly. This is a long time change, there is a reinterpretation of how the Americans see international relations, and we need to find a new model for relations. Reinterpretation can be seen in approach to JCOPA or NATO, it is the challenge.

Who is filling the void? It is not the Europeans. Is it Russia/China? Not the countries we would agree.

If comes to old fashion defence in Europe, we cannot do it without the USA. That is a major problem. We need more European (not necessary EU) cooperation. The question is what will make us move.

Roland Galharague We are living in the extremely unstable world, where decisions cannot be taken for granted. Contemporary problems, first and foremost it is terrorism. It was missing the immediate link between defence and security. The positive side of it is the growth of awareness of the need for European defence. More actors with easier access to technologies help the European defence industry.

Both the world is becoming more dangerous space, but we are also more aware of it. Concerning strategic autonomy, it is a major step forward. For a long time there, there was no perceived need for strategic autonomy. It will become only very vague concept unless Europe becomes stronger. Look how far Czech republic went, look how far Germany went Strategic autonomy depends on the unity of analysis and unity of behaviour. We have made significant progress. Regarding the NATO, it never was smooth sailing. It remains essential. Could have been seen in action in response to chemical attacks in Syria. Of course it is a difficult situation, but we lived through them before. PESCO is a success, it is about very simple things, to increase our interoperability, getting capabilities we lack, to equip us, to make us able to intervene.

Aleš Chmelař started by noting, that spark that started new integration was not new administration in the U.S. but Brexit, migration crisis and change of geopolitical forces. According to him, Europe needs to have its strategic autonomy to be able to deal with conflicts in its neighbourhood and deal with issues being by an order smaller than those with which NATO deals. The Czech Republic is very active on the topic of security and defence, there is strong demand for continuity even as the government changes. He emphasized the importance of EDF, which should advance European integration, the cooperation of defence industries and thinking about European defence. He also stated that we need strategic autonomy, which is not only autonomous, but also effective.

He continued stating that there is a number of conflicts that constituted a problem for the EU but in which EU was not engaged in solving them because it was unable to act in unison, be it the Sahel, Syria, Horn of Africa or zone of eastern partnership. He closed his speech by reiterating that strategic autonomy is a reaction not only to the redefinition of the relations to the United States, but a reaction to changing world. Its meaningfulness is backed by the fact that the UK which never wanted to participate in the common defence now wants to be as close to it as possible.

Miloš Balabán opened the second round of contributions by presenting policy brief of Harald Müller and letting the panellists respond to it.

Lubomír Zaorálek emphasised that European politics cannot go and please for something. It is not about developing some new strategy, Europe was destroyed after Second World war and since then, it gradually reasserts its position. The process is the continuous rebuilding of Europe and we are now surprised what is asked of us. As the world goes onward, Europe must continue to develop further. The United States is also developing in their direction and we might try to cooperate with it but we can hardly influence it and that is why we need our strength.

Edward Rhodes He is reminded of criticism of Johnson in Vietnam Era, tensions between US and Europe under Nixon and dismantling Brettonwood system. And expressed his that each time, it gets better and closer to fruition.

Claudia Major Strategic autonomy is a fashionable and buzzword, it means common vision, institution, capabilities, and industrial underpinning to show that we are serious. We lack a common vision. We have some capabilities about the south, but certainly not for the east. The defence was separated from economical one in the fifties in integration. We have a wonderful project but don't have capacities to defend it. We don't give ourselves the capacity to do it. At the moment, we talk mainly about processes and institutions, but we haven't moved on to implementations. We are excellent in ambitions, but we are really bad in implementation.

Vincenzo Camporini We still do not understand what sovereignty means. It means autonomy to make a decision and ability to carry it out. If we are to be sovereign, we have to be sovereign together.

Roland Galharague All is not black concerning lack of vision. We are moving ahead, very slowly, but we are moving.

Aleš Chmelař mentioned fall of Brettonwood system is good inspiration for the present situation. It created the less stable world and led (over considerable time) to the monetary integration of Europe. Europe is the last predictable player, which may be a strategic disadvantage, but Europe was always stubborn, staying with its approach to decision making. We now have a chance to come up with our European solution, but as we have seen with a common currency, it is a slow process.

Session 2

Strategic autonomy of the EU: The road to better European security?

- EU strategic autonomy: complementarity of capabilities with NATO or deviation from the transatlantic cooperation?
- Joint intervention forces, common defence budget, joint military doctrine: key features of strategic autonomy
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): a way to fulfil the strategic autonomy?
- Priorities, future role and funding of European battlegroups

11:00 – 11:20	Opening speeches	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Claudia Major, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin▪ Arnaud Danjean, Member of the European Parliament, Chairman of the French drafting board working on a Strategic Review of National Defence and Security
11:20 – 12:30	Panel discussion (in alphabetic order)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Vincenzo Camporini, Vice President of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, former Chief of Defence General Staff of Italy▪ Bogdan Klich, Member of the Senate of Poland, Deputy Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs, former Minister of Defence▪ Edward Rhodes, George Mason University, Washington, D.C.▪ Jaromír Zůna, Director of Support Division, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic▪ Miroslav Žižka, former Military Representative of the Czech Republic to the NATO and EU
	Moderator	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Jan Ludvík, Centre for Security Policy IPS FSS CU

Arnaud Danjean opened the panel session with his introductory speech. He suggested that there is a process of strategic awakening undergoing in Europe, and it is important that each European nation takes its part in this process. He noted that everything that was said in the previous session was highly relevant for this development. He believes that politically speaking, we have made a lot of progress as Europeans. Given the high ambitions, however, there is still much to be implemented.

There is currently a political momentum for further progress but he would remain cautious. We have been facing security challenges for the last decade in Europe – the instability in the south (Syria, Arab Spring...), east (Georgia...), and other major strategic events that happened in the past decade – nevertheless, did they prompt European reaction? Not that many main initiatives came afterwards. Arguably, some tweets of Donald J. Trump did more for the strategic awakening of Europeans than considerations of security challenges themselves. That makes the whole endeavour very fragile – it is not sure that European leaders are convinced that defence matters that much. He fears that many leaders would secretly prefer to continue doing the business as usual.

Nevertheless, he thinks that the maintenance of the transatlantic link remains vital and essential for Europe. But even with the strong transatlantic link, we still have to think about our security ourselves. For him, it has always been logical that a civilisation like Europe should have the ambition to build its

strategic autonomy. That does not mean it is already a reality – it is indeed mainly an ambition, as we still lack both political will and adequate capabilities. Therefore, strategic autonomy is a process, not a reality – at least yet.

Under the strategic autonomy, we should mainly be able to assess situations before taking decisions – by ourselves and for ourselves. We still lack many key capabilities in this regard, the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance]. This capability is the key to develop a strategic autonomy for Europe. If we depend on others to assess what is going on, we cannot have any ambition in this direction. This was a case in Iraq in 2003 and it can happen again in future in Iran, and other potential crises. As such, we need an autonomy of assessment.

Moreover, we should be able to act autonomously when needed. That does not mean that we should exclude ad hoc coalitions and alliances. But when it comes to, for example, crisis management in Africa – is that the US or NATO priority? Not really. When there is a crisis in the south, the EU is in the frontline as one of the main actors, and it should be able to act alone and decide autonomously. We still need others – but acting autonomously does not mean destroying alliance; it means making it stronger.

Ultimately, we should be aware that our security is our priority and it relies on our responsibilities. This, again, does not put in question existence and relevance of NATO, everybody agrees on the essential role of NATO in collective defence, an area in which the EU is not able to be completely autonomous. That does not prevent us to do more and be stronger. Old words like “competition” are not relevant anymore. There is a space for everybody to act as there are so many challenges in front of us. The world is unpredictable, uncertain, and volatile; the threats will remain, so we need to be stronger anyway. The core issue is Europeans themselves taking this responsibility again.

Claudia Major First, if we talk about recent developments in European defence, we are possibly missing the point if we talk just about the EU. The most meaningful cooperation in European defence happens outside the EU – for example, German-Dutch or France-UK cooperation. As such, there are two parallel developments: EU defence and European defence.

Second, what are the motivations for strategic autonomy? There are arguably three main motivations: 1. Integration logic; countries like Germany or Italy say that through this endeavour, we need to show that European project is alive and kicking. We need to demonstrate that we can still make progress somewhere. 2. Security and defence logic; countries like France and Finland say that they genuinely want stronger defence, and therefore an exclusive and ambitious PESCO. 3. Default logic – some East and Central European countries are worried that they would be left behind if they don't join PESCO; as such,

it is pragmatically better to stay in than out. France wants an operational, exclusive, and ambitious group of countries – but at the end, PESCO turned out German way: inclusive.

Third, Expectations management. EU is talking about strategic autonomy; but PESCO is not able to fill the famous capability gap. Most PESCO projects are not new and they are not relevant to the procurement of capabilities, the project is more about training. It is legally binding for states but there are no sanctions – other than naming and shaming, which does not work – at least on Germany. If there is no motivation, and conviction to do something, it is unlikely that it would happen. According to Brussels people, the first phase is mainly about motivation. But why not to start right away with the delivery of capabilities? She also notes that maybe she is so critical because we should have the ambition to be able to act on our own – that's a very useful ambition. If we are serious, we shouldn't limit ourselves to crisis management but to think regarding territorial defence. If we are serious about the European project, we should think long-term perspectives. She is missing commitment of most European states, including Germany, to take this part of defence more seriously.

Jan Ludvík then posed a question to the remaining panellists – wondering, what the strategic autonomy means and what tasks and missions it should fulfil?

Vincenzo Camporini wanted to underline one important political fact. Strategic ambition does not mean decoupling. In 1999, when we drafted the Helsinki Headline Goal, avoiding the famous three “D's” – including decoupling – was among the key concepts. The whole thing was done under an idea that there will be sharing between NATO and the EU. NATO would have a “prima nocta” – if NATO does not want to act, the EU can take care of the crisis using NATO instruments. If we maintain this concept, we can talk about strategic autonomy without disrupting the transatlantic link. Moreover, we badly need ISR capabilities, logistics, air to air refuelling etc. Evidence was in the 2011 Libyan crisis. We need to do something real to become autonomous without disrupting the transatlantic link. Are we going in the right direction? Partially.

One of the reasons for inefficiency is that we lack common European market for defence – it is still on the national basis. Every country makes good use of the article, which allows countries to go nationally for the procurement of military capabilities. That's clearly not efficient. See, for example, the issue of fighters: Gripen, Eurofighter etc. You can imagine how much it costs to develop these separated European capabilities. That must be reversed – we must create a united common market in defence. We must provide proper incentives for the nations and the relevant industries to work together. It was a shortsighted decision that the European Commission does not deal with defence. Or see the policy of European Investment Banks – they refused to fund military projects. If there are no incentives, the

selfishness of every single country prevails. We must get out of this vision. Once we find a reasonable compromise, this will also help to our countries' military staffs working together in Europe. Finally, we must also work on standardisation that will help us to be more efficient in defence spending.

Bogdan Klich, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Polish Senate and former Defense Minister of Poland, followed with a note that the question about strategic autonomy mainly needs to be addressed by the current Polish government, not the representative of the minority opposition in Polish Senate. Nevertheless, autonomy is necessary for the full security of our nations. The Atlantic aspect of our security is not enough and we need to create a European dimension.

The concept of European autonomy itself is an outdated debate. Politically, these decisions were taken in 1998 and by the European Council in Cologne in 1999. It is nothing new to us. We expressed for many years willingness to work together and create a European pillar of security. The question is not *whether*, but *how* to enhance and enforce European capabilities – both operation and procurement capabilities – to be more effective. After November' decision of European Council to begin introducing and implementing PESCO, we are still only after the beginning of the end of the crisis that was in the EU in the last years. As a defence minister, he was not just an observer, but a direct participant in many debates about how to overcome these barriers. Nevertheless, due to lack of political will, we were not able to do that. Introducing PESCO is good news and the first sign of overcoming the crisis in the CSDP (not the first one).

Claudia Major is right about raising the question about operational capability and inclusiveness of PESCO. We have a set of tools in our legal framework to reinforce CSDP. We have to choose – if we want to remain in the legal framework or go out of framework; and if we should go for the bottom-up or top-down approach. We should be in favour of bottom-up approach (not top-down, as France prefers) and in favour of inclusiveness, not exclusiveness; moreover, we should be in favour of a legal framework that should be maintained. There is much to do in future.

Edward Rhodes notes that most Americans do not think about European defence issues or European strategic autonomy. In the past, there used to be a concern about *too much* autonomy, while now there is a concern about *not enough* autonomy. As such, generally, it is a good thing that the EU moves towards autonomy. This process requires three related things: greater economic integration, greater military integration, and greater political integration within the EU. The US concern is that we see greater dissonance rather than greater harmony among European states. The European leaders cannot even agree if they should rather deal with Russia or problems in Africa. Moreover, there is a US concern about increasing nationalism in Europe: nationalism is clearly on the rise and more nationalistic approaches are

going to make the journey towards strategic autonomy more difficult. Economic and military integration is much easier than political integration – indeed, it is a further political integration that is going to be the main challenge for the EU's strategic autonomy.

Jaromír Zůna, Director of the Support Division at the Czech Ministry of Defence, brought up two basic questions. The first of them is related to strategic communication – this conference fits well the contemporary developments in Europe; just next week, there will be another movement of US troops through Czech territory. It is clear that in the bigger picture, our geographical position should push us into more intensive involvement in the project of military mobility. However, the media coverage is focusing exclusively on the US movements, although that is just a fraction of NATO military movements through our country. Even larger NATO movements than those of the US troops completely lack media coverage. Generally, in the issue of military mobility, there is much more going on that we might think. Importantly, there are two logistical battalions under development, and we are also modernizing military infrastructure along all the main corridors. In reality, we are doing much more than we can effectively communicate.

He notes that despite what had been said, there is no need to be too sceptical – the main thing is to keep up the current tempo in the political support for the development of national military capabilities. It is also important to enhance media coverage and perception of the society as a whole. If our ambitions are fulfilled by 2025, we will certainly be somewhere else than today. The second point is about EU cooperation in the area of military acquisitions. Arguably, much more progress will be achieved when we manage to get to the point of scrapping the so-called legacy equipment. This is mainly the issue of Eastern and Central Europe: there is a great deal of pre-1990 capabilities still in use. It is a base for our national industry, for high employment, for profits of our companies; this period needs to be overcome to move beyond parochial national interests. Moreover, there is a structural issue: for example, in the Czech Republic, the military industry was privatized, while in Poland it remains mainly state-owned. In this situation, it is difficult to find common ground for cooperation on joint projects. This needs to be improved through future platforms.

Finally, for twenty years, we lived with an expeditionary concept of the army. In case of the serious crisis, we will have to use the army as it is, we will not have the luxury of long-term planning such as in case of expeditionary missions. Today, we simply do not have enough capabilities and reserves for mobilization. In fact, the procurement capability as such is on its limit in many areas. The problem is complex.

Miroslav Žižka, notes that keeping the past commitments is the basis of all. The famous 2% GDP spending commitment is not a dogma and it is not a number that should be considered sacred. We are

getting to the point when there is enough money yet it is not clear that the money is used in a meaningful way for our defence, and that we can effectively contribute to the joint NATO and EU capabilities this way. This is not about doubling NATO capabilities; however, if we want to achieve a strategic autonomy, we need an autonomous leadership and mobility – our outreach cannot end at the borders of the EU, we need it forward deployed, whether we like it or not.

It is not just about the tools, but it is about the capacity to decide and face challenges. In a way, we should be thankful to Putin: in response to the Ukraine events and the deterioration of security environment after 2014, we were able to find a consensus on the defence budget; this was, indeed, the main impulse. The second impulse was, certainly arrogant but truthful, Trump's initiative. It is not imaginable that the United States will continue providing 75% of NATO defence budget.

Currently, the EU has tactical elements, operational elements, but the strategic level is still secured exclusively by NATO. We have more operations than NATO, but insufficient capabilities. We need more standardization and harmony between PESCO and CARD goals; if we can correctly identify the key problems in our capabilities and move that on the PESCO level, we can significantly enhance our strategic autonomy. He is afraid that if PESCO starts with 17 projects, it is simply too much to start with. Many projects in NATO – such as “smart defence” – were short-lived in the absence of implementation and political pressure on the realization of these projects. The best way forward is the match between the EDF, PESCO, and CARD; if that happens, we are on the right path to enhance our strategic autonomy.

Session 3**Technological and industrial independence of Europe as a part of strategic autonomy**

- Strategic Autonomy and related activities of the European Defence Agency
- European defence and security industry: The need for better cooperation?
- The European Defence Fund - An instrument of empowering European technological and industrial independence
- Common defence projects and the future of European defence

13:15 – 13:35	Opening speeches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pieter Taal, Head of Unit Industry Strategy and Wider EU Policies, European Defence Agency ▪ Tomáš Kopečný, Director of Defence Industrial Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic
13:35 – 14:45	Panel discussion (in alphabetic order)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Patrick Bellouard, President of EuroDéfense-France, former Director of OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement/ Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation) ▪ Andrej Čirtek, Spokesperson of Czechoslovak Group Holding ▪ Dušan Švarc, Deputy of Executive Director, Defence and Security Association of the Czech Republic ▪ Martin Uher, Chairman of the Board of Directors, CyberGym Europe, a.s.
	Moderator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Libor Stejskal, Centre for Security Policy IPS FSS CU
14:45 – 14:50	Closing remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Miloš Balabán, Head of the Centre for Security Policy IPS FSS CU ▪

Libor Stejskal expected this panel to be more “on the ground”, then the others, since it will focus on the relationship between industry and legislative bodies, rather than on the general direction of the European Union defence orientation.

Pieter Taal expressed his surprise that the EDA was not mentioned even for a single time during the whole conference. Taal explained the role of EDA in the whole relation between defence professionals and military industry in EU. He spoke about the role of the KSA (Key Strategic Activities) programme. Stating the through KSA, EDA is identifying gaps in the development of European defence capabilities. These gaps were identified in the five individual cases and EDA plans to broaden its identification for thirty cases in general. Issues, which are identified, are of practical nature about the Strategic Autonomy of the EU defence.

Taal also spoke about other agenda of EDA, such as research in the potential double use of technologies (i. e. potential use of civil research in the military field) and also about possibilities of funding for strategic research from different financial sources in the EU. He mentioned general orientation of the EDA, which is to provide unpolitical practical expertise in the European road to strategic autonomy.

Tomáš Kopečný opened by stating, that he will stay in the broad geopolitical arena during his speech and followed by briefly describing historical importance of the current project of EU army and Czechia is glad about this project, however, NATO is a basic pillar of our defence perception. Tomáš Kopečný then continued by describing, how does the joined military concepts works (the need for three countries to participate, etc.). He expressed the opinion that the military development programs should be based on the mid-long term analysis and that development should target the concepts which are only now

beginning to emerge in a strategic area (cyber, advanced tactical planning, AI, etc.). He stated, that he considered EDA to be very useful discussion platform for the future development of the European defence.

Libor Stejskal asked, how do discussants see the relation between the military development and actual real acquisition of the military equipment. He specifically asked the representative of the Czechoslovak group, how does Czech military industry fair in the integration arena, and whether they miss the old national oriented system.

Andrej Čírtek, followed by introducing the TITUS project which is made in international cooperation stated that the governments will (always) be more oriented towards their home industry.

Libor Stejskal then asked Patrick Bellouard, whether this fragmentation is not the reason, why is European defence integration taking so long.

Patrick Bellouard The military market is very specific and very different from the public market. EU autonomy is a goal; satellites, the Galileo program, shows we can do it. Galileo - 22 satellites, it is already in operation, US opposed it, it has given EU autonomy in this domain – it is important because it provides, like the GPS, service to the banks etc. Problems are the lack of cooperation which doubles services. After 2020 we should be able to have military programs funded by the EU, such as the Galileo program.

Dušan Švarc: reacted to the argument for tighter integration by distinguishing to types of military projects. One group, which should be based nationally (Pandurs, or ammunition) and second, which should on EU level (Galileo, etc.). In the first group should be allowed competition, and the market should be less regulated, in the second, the projects should be monopolized.

Libor Stejskal asked about the cyber issues in general.

Martin Uher followed by describing where are the current issues of the cyber projects. Specifically the differences between national and EU agenda and legal discrimination which are European cyber experts facing their foes (who usually do not have to follow any legal rules).

Moderator: what about the chips, we have our Pandurs, but all chips implemented in them are from Asia. Is EDA trying to lessen this dependence?

Pietel Taal stated Europe is in trouble with the chip development. He pointed out, that it is hard to balance the requirements for the civil and military use in Europe.

Libor Stejskal asked, whether the current deal for American made helicopters is not against the Czech stated interest in integration.

Pietel Taal replied by basically stating that “the more helicopters the better”. And that whenever there is this kind of acquisition, there should be questions asked about how does it work with the defence integration.

Tomáš Kopečný stated that the Czech Republic is not against the integration. This kind of acquisition is not against the integration process. That EU defence integration is not going to force member states to

buy bad equipment just for the sake of buying it in EU, and it should not, otherwise it would only fill anti-EU resentments. He also highlighted, that Czechia is buying the technological knowledge with the helicopters, which could be used in the whole EU in the future.

Andrej Čírtek accented that national government first should deal with their issues and that national projects should be conducted with the integration in mind. He also stated that national state will always matter.

Patrick Bellouard: expressed the need for change in a way, how Europeans think about their defence strategies. That Europeans should not just buy stuff from the shelves, but they should develop their own, otherwise Europe will be stuck in a circle.

Miloš Balabán in his closing remarks thanked all of the partners, speakers, participants and organisers.

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